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Abstract 28 
Both humans and non-human animals regularly encounter decisions involving risk and 29 
uncertainty. This paper provides an overview of our research program examining risky 30 
decisions in which the odds and outcomes are learned through experience in people and 31 
pigeons. We summarize the results of 15 experiments across 8 publications, with a total of 32 
over 1300 participants. We highlight 4 key findings from this research: (1) people choose 33 
differently when the odds and outcomes are learned through experience compared to when 34 
they are described; (2) when making decisions from experience, people overweight values at 35 
or near the ends of the distribution of experienced values (i.e., the best and the worst, termed 36 
the “extreme-outcome rule”), which leads to more risk seeking for relative gains than for 37 
relative losses; (3) people show biases in self-reported memory whereby they are more likely 38 
to report an extreme outcome than an equally-often experienced non-extreme outcome, and 39 
they judge these extreme outcomes as having occurred more often; and (4) under certain 40 
circumstances pigeons show similar patterns of risky choice as humans, but the underlying 41 
processes may not be identical. This line of research has stimulated other research in the field 42 
of judgement and decision making, illustrating how investigations from a comparative 43 
perspective can lead in surprising directions.   44 
 45 
Keywords 46 
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Introduction 49 
Humans are typically more risk seeking for losses than gains, and this difference 50 
holds even when identical choices are framed as gains and losses (e.g., Kahneman & 51 
Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). Our line of research began by examining 52 
whether this classic result from behavioural economics would also hold in pigeons, as had 53 
been found with starlings (Marsh & Kacelnik, 2002) and capuchin monkeys (Chen, 54 
Lakshminaryanan, & Santos, 2006). Building from these findings led us to ‘re-discover’ the 55 
description-experience gap (Ludvig & Spetch, 2011), whereby people make different risky 56 
choices when the odds and outcomes are explicitly described vs. when those odds and 57 
outcomes are learned from experience (Hertwig & Erev, 2009). Since then, our journey has 58 
taken turns in other directions as we have sought to clarify how past experiences influence 59 
future decisions, and nearly all of our published work on this topic has been done in humans. 60 
Nevertheless, this line of research has comparative cognition at the heart.  61 
Consider the following scenario: Would you rather win $20 for sure, or take a gamble 62 
with a 50% chance of winning $40 and a 50% chance of winning nothing? Most people here 63 
would choose the guaranteed win. When the same question is cast as losses, i.e., a guaranteed 64 
loss of $20 or a 50% chance of losing $40, most people instead would choose the gamble 65 
(e.g., Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Now, how can you ‘ask’ a pigeon the same questions? 66 
Figure 1A show how, with people, odds and outcomes in these risky decisions are typically 67 
conveyed by means of language or visuals, such as a pie chart. Some studies with non-human 68 
animals, such as with monkeys (Heilbronner & Hayden, 2013, 2016), have been able to 69 
convey described odds using visual stimuli. Another approach is to instead convey odds and 70 
outcomes over successive trials using an operant procedure and have the animal, or human, 71 
learn the contingencies from their own experience. Figure 1B shows this alternate approach, 72 
when the decision problem is posed through experienced odds and outcomes, rather than 73 
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through described ones. This choice procedure, involving pairs of door pictures, was used in 74 
all of our published studies of decisions from experience in humans. 75 
 76 
 77 
Figure 1. Illustration of task design for (A) decisions from description and (B) decisions 78 
from experience, along with (C) risk preferences at the end of the experiment. Risk 79 
preference data is from Madan, Ludvig, & Spetch (2017); “DESC” and “EXP” refer to 80 
decisions from description and experience, respectively. Blocks 4 and 5 correspond to the 4th 81 
and 5th blocks of risky-choice trials within the experiment. Figure adapted from Madan et al. 82 
(2017). 83 
 84 
Studying decisions based on learned contingencies has a long history in operant 85 
conditioning research (e.g., Fantino, 1969; Herrnstein, 1961; Lea, 1979; Staddon & Motheral, 86 
1978) and reflects the way animals make choices in nature, but this approach is quite 87 
different from the way decision making is often studied in humans. Indeed, the famous 88 
studies of Kahneman and Tversky, among others, are based primarily on research that 89 
involves asking people to make choices based on explicitly described scenarios. This verbal 90 
accessibility may add to the appeal of the research program, as even the readers experience 91 
Decisions from Experience Summary  5 
the paradoxes, but often may not represent the types of decision people regularly encounter in 92 
life. Moreover, as we will review below, people make different decisions based on 93 
descriptions than decisions based on experience, even with the same odds and outcomes.    94 
A few years prior to our initial work, evidence had begun to accumulate showing that 95 
risk preferences in humans can change depending on whether the choices are based on 96 
description or experience (Barron & Erev, 2003; Hertwig, Baron, Weber & Erev, 2004). 97 
Specifically, when choosing between risky options that include rare events (i.e., 10% or 98 
lower), people overweight the rare events if the decisions are described. When the same 99 
decisions are based on repeated experience, however, people choose as though they are 100 
underweighting the rare events. For example, given a choice between a 5% chance at $100 101 
and a guaranteed $5, people will generally take the gamble when the problem is described 102 
(overweighting the rare win), but take the sure thing when learned from experience 103 
(underweighting the rare win). 104 
This difference in the weighting of rare events when making decisions based on 105 
described and experienced odds and outcomes has been termed the description-experience 106 
gap (Hertwig & Erev, 2009). As alluded to above, in our early work, we inadvertently 107 
uncovered another type of description-experience gap that did not involve rare events 108 
(Ludvig & Spetch, 2011). As with many advances in science (e.g., Skinner, 1956), this 109 
discovery emerged serendipitously: our initial investigations began with an attempt to re-110 
create the framing effects in the human literature in pigeons (i.e., Tversky & Kahneman, 111 
1981). After multiple failed attempts, we directly applied the procedure we were using with 112 
pigeons to people, now failing to yield the expected results in humans. This additional failure 113 
prompted us to directly pit with people the pigeon-inspired approach (see Fig. 1B) against the 114 
verbal approach drawn the human literature (see Fig. 1A). With this direct comparison of 115 
people’s risky choices when making decisions from experience or description (Figure 1A), 116 
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we found the opposite pattern of choices between these two approaches to conveying risk-117 
related information. Figure 1C shows how, as expected, people were more risk seeking for 118 
losses than for gains in decisions from description, but, contrary to the prevailing findings in 119 
the literature, they were more risk seeking for gains than for losses in decisions from 120 
experience. This pigeon-inspired approach has become the bases of our numerous subsequent 121 
studies with humans. 122 
 123 
General Procedure 124 
As mentioned above, these decisions from experience that have become the staple of our 125 
research on risky choice in humans (Figure 1) were inspired by the comparative approach to 126 
studying behavior. During the task, people are only told that they should try to maximize 127 
their points to earn money, but they are not told what will happen when choosing a particular 128 
door. Instead, they learn from repeated trial-and-error experience about the odds and 129 
outcomes associated with each door. In all of our studies thus far, risk preferences are 130 
assessed in terms of choices between a fixed option that always leads to a specific outcome 131 
and a risky option that leads equally often to either a better outcome or a worse outcome; the 132 
expected value of the fixed and risky options are equal, and there are no rare events. 133 
Typically, the learning set includes two or more pairs of options that differ in value (e.g., 134 
fixed and risky gain options and fixed and risky loss options, or fixed and risky high-value 135 
options and fixed and risky low-value options), and choices among these options are 136 
intermixed.   137 
Relative to other studies on risky decisions from experience in the judgment and 138 
decision making (JDM) literature, our general procedure involves a few novel features, 139 
inspired from the animal literature, which are important to consider when comparing 140 
experimental designs. First, and of perhaps greatest importance, different decisions, e.g., the 141 
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gain and loss decisions, are always inter-mixed within the same block of trials. This key 142 
procedural factor is critical to our main finding (see below) of greater risk seeking for relative 143 
gains than losses. In most other JDM studies, separate decisions, often referred to as 144 
‘problems’, are presented one-after-another sequentially in blocks (e.g., Hertwig et al., 2004). 145 
Along similar lines, in our studies, the side of the screen on which the risky and safe options 146 
are presented is always counterbalanced. Both of these procedural details are related to our 147 
initial beginnings in the comparative cognition literature, where studies of animals often 148 
counterbalance and inter-mix different trial types. As such, this unique perspective and 149 
bridging of the JDM and comparative cognition approaches has been critical to our impact 150 
within the topics of risky decision-making and gambling. 151 
Another important feature of the tasks is that participants make choices between a 152 
safe option and a risky option that can lead equiprobably to two potential outcomes (i.e., 50% 153 
chance of each; see Figure 1), but the safe and risky options always have the same 154 
expected value. For example, as shown in Figure 1, people might choose between a safe 155 
option of +20 points and a risky option that yields +40 points 50% of the time and 0 points 156 
otherwise; both these options have the same expected value (+20). This equivalence is 157 
important as many JDM studies present problems where one option, either risky or safe, has a 158 
higher expected value (e.g., Camilleri & Newell, 2011; Hertwig et al., 2004). For instance, 159 
people may be presented with a choice between a loss of 3 points with a 100% chance vs. a 160 
loss of 32 points with a 10% chance. In these cases, from a reward-maximizing perspective, 161 
there is a correct answer. When the safe and risky options have the same expected value, 162 
however, choices on these decision trials are a measure of risk preference that are not 163 
influenced by differences in reward maximization. Although behavior in such cases does not 164 
indicate the extent to which preference for risk would override differences in expected value, 165 
the choices made when expected value is equal should be sensitive to even mild variations in 166 
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risk preference. Our studies, however, do include catch trials that involve a decision between 167 
options of different reward values, such as a gain vs. a loss, as a manipulation check to assess 168 
whether participants have been paying attention in the experiment and have successfully 169 
learned the outcome contingencies.  170 
Finally, to ensure that participants adequately sample the outcomes associated with 171 
each option, some trials provide only a single option that has to be chosen. These trials 172 
limit participants from only experiencing a small sample of outcomes that inadequately 173 
represents the option, i.e., sampling biases. These single-choice trials avoid instances where a 174 
risky option is initially unlucky and is then never subsequently chosen, known as the hot-175 
stove effect (Denrell & March, 2001). Relatedly, in most of our studies, feedback is only 176 
given for the selected options, termed partial feedback in the JDM literature (e.g., Camilleri 177 
& Newell, 2011; Hertwig & Erev, 2009).  178 
More generally, in all of these experiments, risky choices were presented in blocks of 179 
trials, separated by a riddle to provide a brief break. Participants were neither told how many 180 
trials were included in each block, nor how many blocks comprised the experiment. 181 
Experiments typically consisted of approximately 400-600 trials and lasted 35-45 minutes. 182 
Some experiments included an honorarium based on task performance (i.e., total points 183 
earned), but others did not. When an honorarium was paid, the point-to-money conversion 184 
differed based on task procedures (e.g., both gain and loss decisions, all gains, all losses), but 185 
was not always told to participants. Nonetheless, the choice effects were robust across these 186 
procedural differences (see Figures 6 and 7 below). 187 
 188 
Key findings so far 189 
Over the last few years, we have conducted a series of studies investigating risky decision 190 
making, with an emphasis on the role of memory. Here we provide an overview and 191 
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summary of these studies, focusing on the bigger picture and relationship between the 192 
studies, though each individual paper included additional hypotheses and background not 193 
discussed here. 194 
 195 
1. Biases in risky choice differ for description and experience 196 
A major finding from this work is that people make different risky choices in decisions from 197 
description versus decisions from experience, even without rare events. In decisions from 198 
description choices—where odds and outcomes are explicitly stated, people are more risk 199 
seeking for losses than gains (Figures 1A and 1C). In contrast, people are more risk seeking 200 
for gains than losses in decisions from experience (Figures 1B and 1C; Ludvig & Spetch, 201 
2011; Madan, Ludvig, & Spetch, 2017). Critically, this reversal appears when both types of 202 
decision are made by the same participants (in alternating blocks in the same session) and 203 
even involving the exact same reward values. Whereas the pattern of risk preferences in 204 
decisions from description is consistent with the extant literature (e.g., Kahneman & Tversky, 205 
1979), the reversed pattern of preferences in decisions from experience was novel and has 206 
become the dominant focus of our line of research (Ludvig & Spetch, 2011). 207 
 208 
2.  Extreme outcomes are overweighted in choice 209 
After the initial 2011 study, we conducted a series of experiments with the goal of 210 
understanding the conditions that lead to these differences in risk preferences across 211 
description and experience (Ludvig, Madan, & Spetch, 2014a). For this series of studies, we 212 
focused solely on the decisions-from-experience component of the task and replicated several 213 
times the finding of more risk seeking for gains than losses (see Figure 6). This pattern was 214 
dependent on the relative range of the values experienced—participants were more risk 215 
seeking for relative gains than losses, even when all of the outcomes presented were gains or 216 
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losses. For example, if people were given a set that consisted of high-value gain decisions 217 
(e.g., fixed +60 versus risky +40/+80) and low-value gain decisions (e.g., fixed +20 versus 218 
risky 0/+40), then people made more risky choices for the high-value decisions (relative 219 
gains) than for the low-value decisions (relative losses), such as in the choice behaviour 220 
shown in Figure 5. 221 
To explain these findings, we proposed the extreme-outcome rule, whereby the 222 
extreme outcomes—highest and lowest relative to the range of values experienced—are 223 
overweighted in the decision-making process. In the above example, 0 would be 224 
overweighted as the extreme low value and +80 would be overweighted as the extreme high 225 
value. People behave as though there is a distortion in their subjective probabilities, not 226 
treating the two outcomes for the risky option as equiprobable. Instead, people choose as 227 
though they subjectively attribute a higher probability to the value that was either the best or 228 
worst outcome within the experiment’s overall decision context (see also Lieder, Griffiths, & 229 
Hsu, 2018).  230 
 Recently, we have further refined the extreme outcomes as being defined by 231 
proximity to the edge of the experienced distribution. To do so, we included in the decision 232 
set a second risky option that led to values that neighbor the extreme values, but were not 233 
extreme themselves (Ludvig, Madan, McMillan, Xu, & Spetch, in press). In one of the 234 
experiments, there was a low-value decision set (with values ranging from +5 to +45) and a 235 
high-value decision set (with values ranging from +55 to +95). The extremes were thus +5 236 
and +95. In the low-value set, there was a safe option that led to +25, a risky extreme option 237 
that led to +5 (the extreme) or +45 (non-extreme), as well as a risky neighbor option that 238 
leads to +6 (near the extreme) or +44. As a control group, other participants would instead 239 
have the risky neighbor option that leads to +24 or +26. In this case, proximity to the edge 240 
determined what was overweighted in the decision-making process. Both the extremes 241 
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outcomes (e.g., +5) and their nearby neighbours (e.g., + 6) were overweighted, but not the 242 
remote neighbours (e.g., +24). These results also provided robust evidence against an 243 
alternative hypothesis that discriminability (due to distance from neighbouring outcomes) 244 
was the key factor in determining what counted as an extreme outcome (e.g., Brown et al., 245 
2007). 246 
In another study, we directly manipulated the decision process by hastening the pace 247 
of decisions. In that case, we added both a time constraint on how long participants could 248 
take to make their choices (i.e., time pressure) and shortened the inter-trial interval (Madan, 249 
Spetch, & Ludvig, 2015). Participants were generally more risk seeking when under time 250 
pressure, but the tendency to overweight the extreme outcomes remained the same. This 251 
insensitivity of the extreme-outcome effect to time pressure suggest that the bias emerges 252 
early in the decision process, rather than through a process of extensive deliberation. Here, by 253 
focusing on decisions from experience, we again extended the existing literature on time 254 
pressure and risk, which had previously only focused on decisions from description (e.g., Ben 255 
Zur & Breznitz, 1981; Kocher, Pahlke, & Trautmann, 2013).  256 
 257 
3. Extreme outcomes are overweighted in memory  258 
Given that extreme outcome are indeed overweighted, an important open question was what 259 
psychological mechanism was driving that overweighting. In a related set of studies using an 260 
episodic-memory approach, we had found that people better recalled stimuli associated with 261 
both the highest and lowest reward values (Madan & Spetch, 2012; Madan, Fujiwara, 262 
Gerson, & Caplan, 2012). Based on this confluence of results, we hypothesized that the 263 
overweighting of extremes in choice might be due to an overweighting of these outcomes in 264 
memory. Perhaps the most extremes items are more memorable and are thus more likely to 265 
be retrieved from memory and used to guide choice.  266 
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In Madan, Ludvig, and Spetch (2014), we tested this conjecture directly, by adding 267 
two memory tests after the risky-choice task. First, we presented pictures of each of the doors 268 
(in random order) and asked participants to type the first outcome that came to mind for that 269 
door, which we termed the ‘first-outcome-reported’ test. This test assessed the availability of 270 
each outcome in memory. Next, we again presented each door, but this time also presented 271 
all of the possible outcomes within that experiment (e.g., −40, −20, 0, +20, +40); participants 272 
then estimated the percentage of the time that the presented door led to each of the possible 273 
outcomes, termed the ‘frequency-judgment’ test. This test assessed whether there were 274 
distortions in the remembered frequency of each outcome. Figure 2 shows how participants 275 
demonstrated similar biases in both tests—they were more likely to report the extreme 276 
outcomes (in this example −40 and +40) and attributed higher frequencies to these outcomes.  277 
 278 
 279 
Figure 2. Memory results from the first-outcome reported and frequency judgment 280 
tests. In the first-outcome-reported test, participants are shown each of the choice options 281 
(i.e., doors) one at a time and asked to respond with the first outcome that came to mind. In 282 
the frequency-judgment test, participants were again shown each choice option and asked to 283 
estimate the percentage of the time that the outcome occurred. Figure adapted from Madan et 284 
al. (2017). 285 
 286 
 287 
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This pattern of memory results was further replicated in experiments that included 288 
only gains, only losses, and decision sets with non-overlapping values (Ludvig et al., in press; 289 
Madan et al., 2014, 2017). The overweighting of extremes in memory reports even occurred 290 
when the blocks of decisions from experience were intermixed with blocks of decisions from 291 
description with the same values (Madan et al., 2017). Moreover, in each of these 292 
experiments there was a correspondence between these memory biases and the risky 293 
decisions from experience. Specifically, participants who reported the extreme value in the 294 
first-outcome-reported test for the relative gains were more risk seeking for gain decisions, 295 
and those who reported the extreme value for the relative losses were more risk averse for 296 
loss decisions, compared to those people who reported the non-extreme values. With the 297 
frequency-judgment test, there was again a similar, consistent pattern. People who 298 
remembered a higher frequency for the relative gains were more risk seeking for those gains, 299 
whereas those who remembered a higher frequency for the relative losses were more risk 300 
averse for those losses. 301 
As the memory tests of choice outcomes correlated with preferences in the risky 302 
decisions from experience, we asked whether these memory biases may be responsible for 303 
the differences between decisions from description and experience (Madan et al., 2017). In a 304 
large-scale replication of our initial description-experience study (Ludvig & Spetch, 2011), 305 
but with the memory tests added in, risky choice across the two information formats 306 
(description and experience) was correlated. People who were more risk seeking in decisions 307 
from description were also relatively more risk seeking in decisions from experience. In 308 
addition, as above, the memory biases correlated with peoples’ risky choice in decisions from 309 
experience. This relationship between memory and decisions from experience, however, did 310 
not generalize to decisions from description. There was no reliable correlation between 311 
memory biases and risky choice in the described problems. As such, although there are some 312 
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commonalities to risky decision-making as a whole (e.g., see Frey et al., 2017), decisions 313 
from experience seem uniquely related to these reward-related memory biases.  314 
These studies only provided a correlational link between memory and choice—to go 315 
beyond that, in a further study, we attempted to establish more of a causal relation by subtly 316 
nudging participants to be more risk seeking on specific trials through explicit memory cues 317 
(Ludvig, Madan, & Spetch, 2015). Figure 3 shows how, in this study, each reward value was 318 
matched with an outcome-unique picture (Fig 3A), unlike previous studies (e.g., Figure 1) 319 
where all gain reward values were associated with the same pot of gold picture. This image 320 
was used to prime participants’ memories before specific decision trials in the last block of 321 
the experiment (Figure 3B). This manipulation successfully shifted choice: participants were 322 
significantly more likely to take the risky option after being reminded of past winning 323 
outcomes, as shown in Figure 3C. Such winning cues have also been shown to shift risky 324 
choice in a gambling task with rats (Barrus & Winstanley, 2016). The reminders may have 325 
served to increase the relative availability in memory of the distinct risk-related outcomes 326 
during the decision. As such, choice in these decisions from experience may have some 327 
commonalities with the availability heuristic that manifests in many choice situations (e.g., 328 
Tversky & Kahneman, 1973). 329 
 330 
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 331 
Figure 3. Overview of the priming study, (A) outcome contingencies, (B) trial 332 
procedure, and (C) risk preference results. Panel A illustrates that unique pictures were 333 
associated with each outcome; panel B shows these outcomes in a single trial procedure, as 334 
well as an outcome picture being presented preceding the choice, as a prime. Figure adapted 335 
from Ludvig et al. (2015). 336 
 337 
4. Commonalities across species 338 
The directly comparative angle to this research line has continued throughout, and we have 339 
run several studies on risky choices in pigeons, looking for commonalities and differences 340 
with human choice. In these studies, we have mostly used an open-field procedure to have 341 
pigeons choose a ‘door’ that had a set number of food cups behind it, making the procedure 342 
analogous to our series of studies with humans (Ludvig, Madan, Pisklak, & Spetch, 2014b). 343 
As with our usual procedure with humans, pigeons chose between pairs of safer and riskier 344 
options, which had higher or lower-value possible outcomes. Figure 4 shows a schematic of 345 
the design as well as an illustration of the experimental set-up. Critically, Figure 5 shows 346 
how, in an initial study, we found similar patterns of risk preference across the two species—347 
they were both more risk seeking for the relative gains than the relative losses. This 348 
behavioural convergence suggested that a similar mechanism may be involved in risky 349 
decisions from experience in both species.  350 
Decisions from Experience Summary  16 
 In a series of follow-up experiments, we further manipulated the range of outcomes 351 
experienced by both people and pigeons (Pisklak, Madan, Ludvig, & Spetch, 2018). Using 352 
both the same open-field procedure and an operant variation, when the outcomes included a 353 
zero (i.e., a no-reward option), both pigeons and people showed more risk seeking for high-354 
value than low-value options (as in Ludvig et al., 2014). However, when the lowest outcome 355 
was non-zero (i.e., options always led to at least some reward), then behavior diverged: 356 
People continued to show behaviour congruent with the extreme-outcome rule with more risk 357 
seeking for the high-value than the low-value options, but pigeons did not, as though their 358 
behaviour was more driven by avoidance of the zero (no-reward) outcome than a low 359 
extreme. This comparative divergence presents a nuanced picture of the similarities and 360 
difference in the mechanisms underlying risky decisions from experience in people and 361 
pigeons. In other species, risky choice has been frequently examined (see Weber et al, 2004 362 
for a review) ranging all the way from bees (e.g., Anselme, 2018; Shafir, 1999) to monkeys 363 
(e.g., Hayden & Heilbronner, 2013, 2016), but, to the best of our knowledge, these studies 364 
have yet to evaluate potential sensitivities to extreme outcomes (zero or otherwise) in other 365 
non-human animals. 366 
 367 
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 368 
Figure 4. Open-field procedure. (A) Testing arena for pigeons. Pigeons entered from the 369 
start box and chose which half of the arena to enter through guillotine doors. (B) Reward 370 
contingencies. (C) Photo of setup. Figure adapted from Ludvig et al. (2014b). 371 
 372 
 373 
 374 
 375 
Figure 5. Risk preference results from comparative study for (A) pigeons and (B) 376 
humans. Bar plots (right) show average risk choices over final two blocks of the experiment. 377 
Figure adapted from Ludvig et al. (2014b). For pigeons, the high-value decisions 378 
corresponded to a choice between fixed 3 vs. risky 2 or 4 food cups; low-value decisions 379 
corresponded to fixed 1 vs. risky 0 or 2 food cups (as shown in Figure 4B). For humans, the 380 
high-value decision corresponded to 60 vs. 40 or 80 points; low-value decisions corresponded 381 
to 20 vs. 0 or 40 points. 382 
 383 
  384 
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Overview of Results 385 
Having provided an overview of this programme of research, Figure 6 provides a 386 
comprehensive summary of the decision sets and risky choices in our published studies from 387 
this line of research. This summary chart covers 14 experiments across 7 publications, with 388 
over 1200 participants. (The priming study [Ludvig et al., 2015] is not included in the figure 389 
as it did not include multiple risky options within the experimental design.) Accompanying 390 
this review paper, we have now made the raw data available for almost all of these prior 391 
studies: https://osf.io/eagcd/.  392 
 The extreme-outcome pattern is strikingly clear across studies. In nearly every case 393 
where the extreme-outcome rule would be expected to hold (in blue in the figure), there was 394 
more risk seeking for relative gains and losses, but not where it would not be expected to 395 
apply (the cases in orange). As would be the case with any random sampling process, there 396 
are some exceptions, but the bulk of the published evidence clearly supports the main claim 397 
(aligning with the rationale behind a p-curve analysis; Simonsohn et al., 2014). Although we 398 
summarize the key results of our prior experiments across several publications here, we only 399 
make qualitative comparisons between these results, given recent demonstrations that internal 400 
meta-analyses can problematically overstate the strength of evidence for an effect (Ueno et 401 
al., 2016; Vosgerau et al., 2018). 402 
 The summary of all procedures and results at once reveals several higher-level 403 
findings that were not immediately apparent in the individual studies. For instance, though 404 
people are consistently more risk seeking for relative gains than losses, i.e., the extreme-405 
outcome rule, this effect is larger in magnitude when all of the options in the decision set are 406 
either gains or losses, in comparison to when the decision sets involve a mixture of both gains 407 
and losses. We have suggested that this may be the case because absolute gains and losses are 408 
easy to categorize and categorical memory may overshadow memory for the exact values 409 
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(Ludvig et al., in press). When all the values are either gains or losses, people may attend 410 
more to the specific values and be more sensitive to the extremes of the range. The figure 411 
also makes apparent that risk preferences were rarely much above 50%, even for high-valued 412 
gains; instead, in these decisions from experience, we typically find strong risk aversion for 413 
the relative losses and risk neutrality or weak risk preference for the relative gains.   414 
 415 
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Figure 6. Comprehensive summary of risky choices in our previously published papers. 417 
For decisions, “X” denotes the condition with extreme values, “NX” denotes non-extremes, 418 
“Ng” denotes neighbour values. “Desc” and “Exp” denote decisions from description and 419 
experience, respectively; when not stated otherwise, all decisions were made from 420 
experience. Outcome values for the risky gain and high-value options are shown in green and 421 
upward triangles, with the corresponding safe option shown as black circles; risky losses and 422 
low-value options are shown in red and downward triangles, with the corresponding safe 423 
option shown as a white square; other outcome values are shown in gray markers. The 424 
proportions of risky choices for these decisions, P(Risky), are shown correspondingly in 425 
green, red, or gray. Differences in risky choices between pairs of decisions are shown in the 426 
Diff(P(Risky)) section. Pairings where the extreme-outcome rule is thought to apply are 427 
shown in blue; other pairings are shown in orange. Studies are ordered chronologically. Error 428 
bars are 95% confidence intervals. (Note that error bars in some previously published figures 429 
were SEMs.) 430 
 431 
 Figure 7 provides a parallel summary of the memory results from all the studies that 432 
included memory tests. For the first-outcome-reported test, results indicate the proportion of 433 
participants who reported the more extreme value of the decision set, relative to all of those 434 
who responded with a ‘valid’ outcome (i.e., an outcome that was associated with the risky 435 
option, not an ‘other’ outcome). Frequency judgment results are treated similarly, showing 436 
the relative proportion of responses for the more extreme value. As can be observed even 437 
within the individual studies, the first-outcome measure demonstrates more pronounced 438 
biases than the frequency-judgement test. This overview, however, makes apparent a few 439 
interesting consistencies across experiments. In particular, the bias to remember extreme 440 
outcomes appears to be consistently larger for outcomes associated with loss and low-value 441 
decisions than for outcomes associated with gain and high-value decisions, in both the first-442 
outcome-reported tests and the frequency-judgment tests.  443 
There is also an indication that decision sets that are within one domain (i.e., all gains 444 
or all losses) lead to stronger memory biases than instances where both gains and losses are 445 
used. This pattern may suggest that differences in outcome magnitude are more salient than 446 
differences in reward valence. This incidental finding was previously suggested in Ludvig et 447 
al. (in press, p. 12), “attending to category information (i.e., gain or loss) may overshadow 448 
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learning of specific outcomes.” The summary provided here provides more direct quantitative 449 
evidence for this result. Nonetheless, further research would be needed to test this mechanism 450 
directly. 451 
 452 
 453 
 454 
Figure 7. Summary of memory results from previously published risky decision-making 455 
studies. Memory results are shown as proportions of valid responses, i.e., not including 456 
responses from participants for outcomes that did not occur for the respective risky outcome. 457 
“X” denotes the condition with extreme values, “NX” denotes non-extremes, “Ng” denotes 458 
neighbour values. Outcome values for the risky gain and high-value options are shown in 459 
green and upward triangles, with the corresponding safe option shown as black circles; risky 460 
losses and low-value options are shown in red and downward triangles, with the 461 
corresponding safe option shown as a white square; other outcome values are shown in gray 462 
markers. Studies are ordered chronologically. Error bars are 95% confidence intervals. (Note 463 
that error bars in some previously published figures were SEMs.) 464 
 465 
 466 
Current lines of investigation 467 
 There are several important open questions that we are attempting to answer in 468 
ongoing studies. For example, we have been pushing on the comparative angle to better 469 
assess the degree to which the mechanisms overlap or diverge across species. To that end, we 470 
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have run several further studies with pigeons, including with an operant touchscreen 471 
procedure, to allow for closer matched comparisons between species (see above; Pisklak et 472 
al., 2018). In addition, to more closely link our work with the existing JDM literature, we are 473 
studying the impact of the extreme-outcome rule when decisions are not inter-mixed or when 474 
some outcomes occur only rarely as is typically studied in decisions from experience (e.g., 475 
Hertwig & Erev, 2009). Whereas the extreme-outcome rule is based on the extremity of the 476 
reward values experienced within the decision context, the frequency (or infrequency) of 477 
these outcomes is not considered, as our procedures have always used risky options that 478 
could only lead to two, equiprobable outcomes.  479 
Another fundamental question that remains unanswered is what defines the decision 480 
context. As shown in Figure 6, the inclusion of a higher or lower set of values within an 481 
experiment can strongly influence risky choices on a specific decision set. For instance, for 482 
the exact same decision between 100% +20 points and an option that yields 50% +40 points 483 
or 50% 0 points, people are more risk seeking when the other outcomes in the decision set 484 
involve losses than when the other decision set involves higher-valued gains. In current work, 485 
we have borrowed from the memory literature to instantiate distinct contexts within a single 486 
experiment that provide different decision sets (Madan, Ludvig, & Spetch, 2018). We have 487 
recently undertaken a series of experiments to examine how visual and temporal contexts 488 
involving distinct decision sets may affect the extreme-outcome rule. 489 
While we have ongoing work to further this line of research, others have also 490 
recognized the utility of this approach to decisions from experience and begun to use similar 491 
paradigms with their own adjacent research questions in mind. For example, Konstantinidis, 492 
Taylor, and Newell (in press) used the same general procedure, but manipulated the 493 
magnitude of the gains and losses. Whereas many of our studies have used choices between 494 
100% 20 points vs 50% 40 points, Konstantinidis and colleagues examined choices across 495 
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four orders of magnitude, with the safe option being either 2, 20, 200, or 2000. They found 496 
that the extreme-outcome rule, greater risk seeking for relative gains than losses, was largest 497 
in magnitude for the smaller reward values and diminished when the reward values were in 498 
the thousands.  499 
In a further extension, St-Amand, Sheldon, and Otto (in press) used a risky-choice 500 
task based on our procedure, but preceded it with either an episodic-specificity or a general-501 
impressions induction task. The former task was designed to increase participants’ attention 502 
to specific episodic details (e.g., Madore et al., 2014; Madore & Schacter, 2016); in contrast, 503 
the latter task asked participants to focus on ‘gist’-like impressions. Interestingly, St-Amand 504 
et al. found that the general impressions induction task led to decreased risk taking and no 505 
bias in memory recall. In contrast, participants given either the episodic-specificity induction 506 
task or no induction task had comparable risk preference patterns and biased memory recall. 507 
More generally, the extreme-outcome rule has also found support with varied designs (Cox & 508 
Dallery, in press; Le Pelley et al., in press; Wispinski et al., 2017).  509 
Recent theoretical accounts of risky choice and the underlying sampling process have 510 
also incorporated the findings of this line of work (e.g., Gershman & Daw, 2017; Lieder et 511 
al., 2018). For example, in a recent theoretical analysis, Lieder et al. (2018) developed a 512 
rational model of decision-making wherein experienced outcomes were weighted by both 513 
their probability and their extremity. Their model provided a strikingly strong fit to our 514 
pattern of empirical results (e.g., from Madan et al., 2014), while also explaining other 515 
aspects of the description-experience gap. They further showed that such an overweighting of 516 
extremes, as we have repeatedly observed, actually reflects a rational use of limited cognitive 517 
resources. Their key idea is that, with a limited number of samples to draw from memory, 518 
overemphasizing the most extreme outcome leads to less variance in utility estimates and 519 
better overall performance. 520 
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Conclusion 521 
Across 8 publications involving over 1300 participants, we have shown how the extreme-522 
outcome rule, in which people are more risk-seeking for relative gains than for relative 523 
losses, is extremely robust and replicable. We have also shown, however, that this effect is 524 
dependent on key procedural features. The extreme-outcome rule only manifests when 525 
outcomes are learned through experience rather than being described, and it requires the 526 
intermixing of choices involving relative gains and losses within the same context. For 527 
example, the absolute level of risk preference for a choice between a fixed option leading to 528 
+20 points and a risky option leading to either +10 or +30 points, depends on whether the 529 
choice occurs in the context of other choices that involve losses or other choices that involve 530 
higher valued gains (see Madan et al., 2018).  531 
One of the key findings in this research is that the extremes in a range of values are 532 
overweighted in both memory and choice. This result may represent another example of a 533 
general finding that values at the ends of a distribution have a privileged status. For example, 534 
with serially presented items, the first and last items experienced are better remembered (i.e., 535 
primacy and recency effects; Murdock, 1962; Wright, Santiago, Sands, Kendrick, & Cook, 536 
1985). Humans also recall items associated with the highest and lowest values in a value-537 
association task (Madan & Spetch, 2012). In perceptual discrimination tasks such as judging 538 
line-length, people are more accurate with values that fall at the ends of the distribution than 539 
for values in the middle of the distribution (e.g., Moon, Fincham, Betts & Anderson, 2015). It 540 
may be that the edges of a distribution across numerous dimensions have ecological 541 
relevance and command attention because they provide the boundary conditions for an 542 
experience. For example, in a foraging context, it may be important to track not only the 543 
overall rate of return, but also the best and worst returns, in order to learn the range of 544 
possible outcomes for a particular decision.  545 
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There are many questions remaining about the generality of the extreme-outcome 546 
effect. From a comparative perspective, more research is needed to determine to what degree 547 
the processes underlying the effect in humans are shared with other animals. Although our 548 
first comparative study showed striking similarities in the pattern of choice behavior between 549 
pigeons and humans (Ludvig et al., 2014), follow-up work with a wider range of outcome 550 
values suggest that differences may exist in the mechanisms, with pigeons being particularly 551 
sensitive to zero values (Pisklak et al., 2018). Research on other species is needed to 552 
determine the species generality of sensitivity to extreme outcomes or to zero values. 553 
Research on humans using consummatory reinforcers, as opposed to secondary non-554 
consumable reinforcers, such as points or money, may also help to make stronger 555 
comparative comparisons (see Hayden & Platt, 2009). Though it is more difficult to probe for 556 
memory recall in animals, creative procedures are being developed in other non-human 557 
species (e.g., Crystal, 2009; Eacott & Easton, 2007). Whether the extreme-outcome rule 558 
would generalize to other features of rewards besides magnitude is also an important future 559 
research question. For example, would people or other animals overweight the extremes of 560 
delays to an outcome, the number of responses required to obtain an outcome, or the quality 561 
of the outcome (e.g., palatability of food)?  562 
On the theoretical side, important questions remain also about how best to model the 563 
choice process in decisions from experience (e.g., Erev et al., 2017; Lieder et al., 2018). One 564 
emerging theme is that people seem to be sampling from their memories of past outcomes, 565 
which can effectively percolate biases in memory into choice (e.g., Shadlen & Shohamy, 566 
2016; Stewart, 2009). A similar sample-based proposal has recently been forwarded in the 567 
comparative literature, to account for many challenging phenomena in animal learning, such 568 
as spontaneous recovery and latent inhibition (Ludvig, Mirian, Kehoe, & Sutton, 2017). A 569 
second theme highlights the important role of decision context—options are always evaluated 570 
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relative to others in the same context, but what defines the context is still underdetermined 571 
(Bornstein & Norman, 2017).  572 
This line of research began with a straightforward comparative question and 573 
blossomed into a line of research that has implications for models of decision making in 574 
humans and other animals. Thus, this research provides another example of how the 575 
comparative approach—in which animals must be ‘asked’ using behavioral methods and 576 
learning by experience is emphasize—can be fruitfully merged with other disciplines to 577 
provide a richer understanding of important cognitive processes (e.g., see Twyman, Nardi & 578 
Newcombe, 2013).  579 
 580 
  581 
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